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Abstract
This document overviews an object-oriented (OO) modeling approach and a
software product line (SPL) methodology used to model the Barbados Crash Man-
agement System Product Line (referred to as bCMS-SPL), as well as for a reference
variant of such a product line (referred to as bCMS). The approaches and the mod-
eling languages used have been chosen in order to comply with widely used practices
and/or (de facto) standards.
The starting point for this eﬀort is a set of requirements described in a brief
requirements document [5]. Products of bCMS-SPL are intended to support dis-
tributed crisis management by police and fire personnel for automotive accidents
on public roadways. While police and fire personnel have complementary respon-
sibilities to be done concurrently, these eﬀorts need to be coordinated in order to
ensure eﬃcient and eﬀective management of a given crisis. As such, the bCMS-SPL
models focus on the functionality of the Police Station Coordinator (PS coordinator)
and the Fire Station Coordinator (FS coordinator) and their interactions. The scope
of the bCMS-SPL starts with the notification of a crisis to the PS coordinator and
FS coordinator concludes at the point when all fire and police personnel have been
released from the given crisis. The assumption is that high-level requirements have
been gathered and stated in the form of use cases for the bCMS. The modeling
of the bCMS and bCMS-SPL target the late requirements briefly overviews the
refinement to system architecture.
The OOmodeling approach provides structural context information and behavior
information to be used to provide a late requirements specification of the bCMS.
The structural context information is captured in terms of a domain model using
the class diagram notation, including a data dictionary. The behavior information
is described in terms of sequence diagrams that model specific scenarios between the
key elements of a system, and interacting state diagrams that describe the behavior
of a given element as it behaves across multiple scenarios.
In order to create a SPL model for the bCMS-SPL, we use model elements
from the bCMS late requirements OO model and the variabilities described in the
high-level requirements document [5]. The SPL model comprises a feature diagram
and OO model fragments, each of which describes the structural and behavioral
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information for a given variation point. These OO model fragments are described
in terms of the same UML diagrams as those used to model the bCMS. The key
diﬀerence is that inheritance and stereotypes are used to capture the SPL concerns.
The SPL models can then be used to derive the complete OO late requirement
specification of each planned SPL variant.
1 Assumptions
The following are those assumptions we made when modeling the bCMS and bCMS-
SPL.
• In the Sequence Diagrams, messages between actors are synchronous and instan-
taneous.
• It is out of the scope of the system to propose a route plan for the police cars.
• The PS coordinator proposes at least one route plan to the FS coordinator.
• As a police car/fire truck can be recalled in case the crisis is less severe than
expected, it is assumed that at least one police car/fire truck has arrived to the
crisis location. It is up to the police oﬃcers/fireman that have first arrived to
check the severity of the crisis, and notify to its coordinator. The coordinator,
depending on the provided information, may recall any number of vehicles.
• The case in which a police car/fire truck does not reach its destination within the
ETA because of traﬃc jams or blocked routes (i.e. alternative scenario 5.b in [5])
it is considered as a particular case in which the vehicle is delayed because it broke
down (i.e alternative scenario 5.a in [5]). Therefore, a route plan that was already
agreed between the PS coordinator and FS coordinator will not be rescheduled due
to the delay of a vehicle.
2 OO modeling approach
During the late requirements phase, the structural view describes the key elements of
the system and their relationships, while the behavioral view describes the high-level
behavior of those elements. The class diagram notation is used to construct a domain
model of the system that describes the elements of the system and the portion of the
environment with which those elements interact. For example, while the PS coordinator
and FS coordinator are (some of) the key elements of the bCMS system, the PS coordina-
tor needs to interact with individual police units that are also modeled, but their detailed
functionality is beyond the scope of this modeling eﬀort. Therefore, the individual police
unit is included in the domain model to provide context for the system elements serv-
ing as an entity to receive and send information to the PS coordinator. For each class
element in the domain model, we include a data dictionary entry that briefly describes
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the purpose of the class, attributes, and operations. It also includes descriptions of any
relationships in which the class participates (e.g., aggregation, association, etc.).
Next, we describe the key scenarios outlined in the requirements document using se-
quence diagrams. Each sequence diagram contains interactions between object instances
of the classes (from the domain model) using messages that have been declared as op-
erations in the domain model for the respective class. Messages may also be predicated
by boolean guards involving attributes (also defined in the domain model for the re-
spective class element). Then by focusing on individual object instances across all the
scenarios, we can collect all the relevant behavior for a given class to create its state
diagram. Therefore, a state diagram is created for each key class that includes its be-
havior across all the modeled scenarios. As such, as a means of validation, we should
be able to trace the behavior of a given scenario by traversing the state diagrams for all
the objects involved in the scenario. But the state diagram should also include comple-
mentary transitions from those reference in the sequence diagrams in order to provide a
comprehensive description of the behavior of a given class. For example, there might be
a scenario that describes the interaction between the PS coordinator and a police unit
that is still at the police station when a crisis has been identified. Then there should
also be behavior added to the PS coordinator state diagram that describes what should
happen when a police unit is not at the police station (e.g., diﬀerent route, etc.).
In general, we should be able to check for consistency between the structural models
and the behavior models. For example, all messages in the sequence diagrams should be
defined as operation names in the class diagram and should appear as triggers or actions
in the state diagrams. Moreover, any guards on the messages in sequence diagrams and
state diagrams should involve attributes that have been defined in the class diagram.
During the high-level design, the structural view describes the software architecture
and the behavior of the software components of the architectural elements. As part of
the OO process, high-level design involves refining the information from the requirements
stage to include design-level information. First, a decision needs to be made as to what
software architecture should be used to describe the target system; this decision process
refers to the structural design of the system. A number of architectural styles have been
proposed, each of which facilitates diﬀerent types of interactions between the subsystems
of a system. In the case of the bCMS system, a variation of the peer to peer (P2P)
architectural style is used. In this case, the PSC System and FSC System, each can act
as a server and client, depending upon the specific situation. The key elements may
be refined to include additional subcomponents that provide aggregate behavior. For
the behavior portion of the high-level design, the state diagrams of the key elements
may be refined to include more implementation details. And the subcomponents of the
key elements are described in terms of state diagrams. Additional sequence diagrams
can be created to capture the additional behavior details. In addition, we can add
sequence diagrams to capture exceptional cases. In short, all sequence diagrams should
be validated against the collection of state diagrams.
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2.1 Domain Model
This section introduces the key elements of the system captured in the domain model
(see Figure 1), both the bCMS-SPL elements, as well as physical and environmental
elements that interact with bCMS-SPL and/or provide context for its behavior. The
key software elements of the domain model have been described in a data dictionary. For
brevity, we only include the descriptions of the key operations of the FSC System, since
many of the operations have analogous counterparts in PSC System. Furthermore, the
FS Coordinator and PS Coordinator are humans interfacing with the respective System
elements, and therefore are not described in detail for this preliminary submission. The
data dictionary entries includes the attributes and operations of each class element, as
well as any relationships in which the element participates (e.g., aggregation, association,
etc.). Due to its length, we include the data dictionary as an appendix, so that it may






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Domain model.
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2.2 Scenarios
This section overviews the key functional scenarios that were enumerated in the require-
ments document [5]. For reader convenience, we include the list of scenarios from the
requirements document as follows. Each of the steps of the following scenario descrip-
tions have been modeled by means of sequence diagrams (see Figures 2- 11). Each of
these sequence diagrams are detailed next.
Main Scenarios:
1. PSC and FSC establish communication and identification of coordinators.
2. PSC and FSC exchange crisis details.
3. PSC and FSC develop a coordinated route plan in a timely fashion for number of
vehicles to be deployed to specific locations with respective ETAs.
3.1. PSC and FSC state their respective number of fire trucks and police vehicle
to deploy.
3.2. PSC proposes one route for fire trucks and one route for police vehicles to
reach crisis site.
3.3. FSC agrees to route.
4. PSC and FSC communicate to each other that their respective vehicles have been
dispatched according to plan (per vehicle).
5. PSC and FSC communicate to each other their arrival (per vehicle) at targeted loca-
tions.
6. PSC and FSC communicate to each other completion (per vehicle) of their respective
objectives.
7. PSC and FSC agree to close the crisis.
Alternative and Exceptional Scenarios:
At step 3 when the duration of the negotiation exceeds a predefined limit:
3.a1. A timeout is recorded in the system.
3.a2. PSC and FSC are alerted that a timeout has occurred for completing the
negotiation.
3.a3. PSC and FSC are allowed to continue with the sub-step of step 3 where the
timeout occurred.
3.a4. In parallel to 3.a3, PSC and FSC report the reason for timeout.
At step 3.3 when the FSC disagrees with the proposed route:
3.3.a1. The PSC removes the proposed route from the possible routes.
3.3.a2. Continue with step 3.2.
At step 3.3.a2 when there is no more route left to be proposed:
3.3.a2.a1. The PSC informs the FSC that the route will not be coordinated and
that updates of vehicle locations and crisis details are still to be exchanged.
3.3.a2.a2. Continue with step 4.
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At step 5 when a police vehicle/fire truck does not reach its destination within
the ETA because of vehicle break down:
5.a1. The PSC/FSC informs the other coordinator of the new ETA and, if neces-
sary, that a replacement vehicle is on its way.
5.a2. Continue with step 5.
At step 5 when a police vehicle/fire truck does not reach its destination within
the ETA because of traﬃc or blocked routes:
5.b1. Continue with step 3.
At step 5 when the crisis is more severe than expected:
5.c1. Continue with step 3.
At step 5 when the crisis is less severe than expected:
5.d1. The PSC/FSC informs the other coordinator of recall of one or more police
vehicles/fire trucks, respectively.
5.d2. Continue with step 5.
At any step M when communication is not available:
M.a1. PSC and FSC continue to address the crisis individually, and both will
coordinate through their personnel once their personnel have reached the crisis site
(this resolution is out of scope for bCMS).
At any step N when communication has been restored after a period of un-
available communication:
N.a1. If the crisis has been resolved (i.e., the objectives of all vehicles have been
reached), then continue with step 7.
N.a2. If communication between PSC and FSC has not yet been established (step
1 has not yet been reached), then continue with step 1.
N.a3. If the route agreement has been reached (the use case is between step 4 and
6, inclusive), then exchange information on routes established for police and fire,
location of vehicles, and status of crisis and for each vehicle continue with step
4, 5, or 6 depending on the location of a vehicle.
N.a4. If the route agreement has not been reached and the time limit for the route
negotiation has not yet expired (the use case is between step 2 and 3.2, inclusive),
then continue with step N.
N.a5. If the route agreement has not been reached and the time limit for the route
has expired (the use case is between step 3.1 and 3.2, inclusive), then exchange
information on routes established for police and fire, location of vehicles, and
status of crisis and for each vehicle continue with step 4, 5, or 6 depending on
the location of a vehicle.
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2.2.1 Steps 1 and 2
The sequence diagram shown in Figure 2 models the establishment of the communication
between the coordinators and their respective identification (step 1), and the informa-
tion exchange about the crisis details (step 2). The sequence diagram starts with an
alternative block to capture the non-determinism about who (i.e., either the PS coordi-
nator or FS coordinator) would send the first request to establish the communication. As
we assume that messages between actors are synchronous and instantaneous, is enough
a peer receives a message to consider that the communication is established.
The following the alternative, comes a parallel block, which is used to model the
diﬀerent possibilities in which the authentication can be done: either the PS coordinator
sends his credential first, or the FS coordinator does so. In any case, both behaviors are
possible.
The last block is also a parallel block, and it is used in the same manner as the
previous one, but to model the way in which the coordinators exchange the details
about the crisis.
2.2.2 Steps 3
The sequence diagram on Figure 3 models the entire sequence of interactions for step
3 of the scenario, including its diﬀerent alternatives. The sequence diagram starts by
modeling the way in which the coordinators state their respective number of vehicles to
deploy at the crisis location (step 3.1). It follows with a parallel block. The first part
of this parallel block contains the messages the PS coordinator and FS coordinator may
exchange to achieve an agreement about the route plan that allows fire trucks to arrive
to the crisis location. The PS coordinator will keeping proposing to the FS coordinator a
rout plan for the fire trucks until either the FS coordinator agrees to the proposal, or the
PS coordinator has no more propositions to oﬀer (alternative scenario 3.3.a2).
The second part of the parallel block is used to capture the case in which the ne-
gotiation of the route plan between the PS coordinator and FS coordinator exceeds a
predefined time (alternative scenario 3.a). In that case, each coordinator, after being
notified about the time out by the message routeNegotiationTimeout, he must fulfill a
report explaining the reason why such a timeout was reached.
2.2.3 Steps 4
Figure 4 shows the sequence diagram that models the step in which the coordinators
notify one another that their respective vehicles have been dispatched. Since the notifi-
cation is done for each vehicle, and OCL [16] expression in used to describe the predicate
used by the loop block. This predicate says that the messages enclosed in the parallel
block are exchanged while the number of dispatched police cars, plus the number of fire
trucks is lower than the number of requested police cars, plus the number of requested
fire trucks. The number of requested police cars (resp. fire trucks) is known by counting
the number of existing instances of type PoliceCar are bound to the Crisis by the associ-
ation allocate. On the other hand, the number of dispatched police cars (resp. for fire
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Figure 2: Sequence Diagram for steps 1 and 2.
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Figure 3: Sequence Diagram for step 3.
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trucks) is known by counting the number of PoliceCar instances whose status is equal to
“inRouteToLocation”.
2.2.4 Steps 5
For easing the visibility and reading of the sequence diagram that models the arrival
of the vehicles to the crisis location, the diagram is presented in three parts through
Figures 5-7. The aim of this sequence diagram is to model the notification that each
coordinator does to once a dispatched vehicle arrives to the crisis location.
The sequence diagram (see Figure 5) starts with a loop block. The predicate of this
block says that the contents are performed while the number of arrived police cars plus
the number of fire trucks is lower than the number of requested police cars plus the
number of fire trucks. The way of finding this numbers is quite the same as already
explained in the step 4.
The content of the loop block is determined by a parallel block divided into four parts.
The first part of the parallel block describes the diﬀerent messages the FS coordinator
may send to the PS coordinator, depending on the fire truck has arrived on time or not.
In case the fire truck is delayed (alternative scenario 5.a.1), the PS coordinator may
decide either to replace such a fire truck by another one, or to simply assign a new ETA.
In any case, each decision has to be communicated to the PS coordinator.
The diﬀerent messages that the PS coordinator may send to the FS coordinator are
described in the second part of the parallel block (see Figure 6). Since the rationale
behind these messages is similar to what was explained for the FS coordinator, no further
details about these messages is given.
The third part of the parallel block (see Figure 7) models the alternative scenarios
that may take place when (at least) a police car has arrived at the crisis location. Once
a police oﬃcer is at the crisis location, he might communicate to the PS coordinator
that the crisis is either more or less severe than expected. In case the crisis is more
severe that expected (alternative scenario 5.c1), the PS coordinator must notify such a
situation to the FS coordinator to start developing a new route plan for the extra required
vehicles. In case the crisis is less severe than expected (alternative scenario 5.d1), the
PS coordinator notifies the FS coordinator that he has recalled some police cars since they
were not required any more.
The same situations, but from the FS coordinator viewpoint are described in the
fourth (and last) part of the parallel block.
2.2.5 Steps 6
The sequence diagram shown in Figure 8 models the way in which each coordinator
notifies its respective peer about the completion of the vehicle objectives. Since the
notification is done for each vehicle, then the parallel block (used to capture the non-
determinism about the order in which the notifications are exchanged between the co-
ordinators) is enclosed within a loop block. This loop block allows the parallel block to
be performed while either a police car or fire truck remains at the crisis location. This
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 : PS coordinator  : FS coordinator : FSC System : PSC System
[let 
        numRequestedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(PoliceCar)->size()
        numRequestedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(FireTruck)->size()
        numDispatchedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status <> ´'inRouteToLocation´')->size() 
        numDispatchedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status <> ´'inRouteToLocation´')->size() 
in











Figure 4: Sequence Diagram for step 4.
13/85
Figure 5: Sequence Diagram for step 5 - Top part.
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Figure 6: Sequence Diagram for step 5 - Middle part.
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Figure 7: Sequence Diagram for step 5 - Last part.
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 : PS coordinator  : FS coordinator : FSC System : PSC System
[let 
        numPoliceCarsAtLocation:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status = ´'atLocation´')->size() 
        numFireTrucksAtLocation:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status = ´'atLocation´')->size() 
in











Figure 8: Sequence Diagram for step 6.
information is retrieved by counting the number of PoliceCar and FireTruck instances
whose status is “atLocation”.
2.2.6 Steps 7
The sequence diagram shown in Figure 9 models the agreement reached by the coordina-
tors to close the crisis. It is was assumed that a crisis can be only closed once every single
vehicle has returned back to its central station. This fact is captured in the sequence
diagram by the loop block, which has a predicate an OCL expression that remains true
while the status of each PoliceCar and FireTruck is diﬀerent from “station”.
Once each vehicle has returned back to its station, the coordinators are ready to
notify to each other of their willingness to close the mission. This information is modeled
by the parallel block, at the bottom of the sequence diagram.
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        numRequestedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(PoliceCar)->size()
        numRequestedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(FireTruck)->size()
        numReturnedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status <> ´'station´')->size() 
        numReturnedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status <> ´'station´')->size() 
in

















Figure 9: Sequence Diagram for step 7.
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Figure 10: Unavailable communication.
2.2.7 Communication is not available/has been restored
Here, the scenario description considers the case in which the communication infrastruc-
ture that enables the coordinators to interact is not available. The sequence diagram
shown in Figure 10 models the messages sent by the PSC System and FSC System to their
respective coordinators to notify them that they will continue dealing with the crisis in
a stand-alone mode.
As soon as the communication infrastructure has been restored, the PSC System and
FSC System will synchronize. The synchronization of a system is considered as the com-
munication of its current state to its peer system. Once the system has synchronized, it
notifies its respective coordinator that the crisis will resume being handled in a collab-
orative manner. Figure 11 shows the sequence diagram that models the restoration of
the communication.
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Figure 11: Restored communication.
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2.3 State Machines
This section presents the state diagram used to describe the behavior of the key classes
PS coordinator, FS coordinator, PSC System, and FSC System. The state diagrams are
modeled according to the semantics defined by Harel et al. [7, 8]. Thus, each state
diagram describes what is widely known as a Harel’s statechart. In the remaining part
of this paper, the terms state diagram, state machines and statecharts are considered
synonymous. Statecharts comprise states that are connected by transitions. Each state
can be simple or complex, meaning that it could contain entry/exit conditions, internal
activities, etc. A transition has three possible elements, a trigger that captures an event
to warrant movement from one state to another; a boolean guard that indicates that
conditions that have to be true in order to take the transition; and an action list that
comprises one or more actions that are generated as a result of the transition. Triggers
and actions typically correspond to operation definitions in a class; and a guard is usually
a boolean expression involving one or more attributes defined in the classes.
As the key elements within the Domain Model are assumed to exist concurrently, the
statecharts that model their behavior must also co-exist. This modeling requirement is
captured by putting in parallel the respective statecharts. These statecharts in parallel
define a new statechart that is shown in Figure 12. It is considered the starting point
for understanding the overall behavior of the system (defined by PSC System and FSC
System) with its environment (defined by PS coordinator and FS coordinator). The next





Figure 12: Parallel composition of the diﬀerent existing state machines.
2.3.1 PS/FS coordinator
Due to the similarity between the PS coordinator and FS coordinator with respect to
their behavior, we only provide details for one of them. The PS coordinator statechart is
described in detail here, where the statechart for the FS coordinator would be comparable.
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Figure 13 shows the statechart that models the behavior of the PS coordinator class,
and Figure 14 shows the one that corresponds to FS coordinator. These behaviors were
inferred by the messages that are sent or received by instances of type PS coordinator (FS
coordinator, respectively), which were modeled through the sequence diagrams depicted
in Figures 2-11. Every incoming message modeled in a sequence diagram, represents an
event in a statechart, whereas an outgoing messages represents an action.
In summary, the statechart shown in Figure 13 indicates that a PS coordinator ei-
ther calls the FS coordinator or receives a call from it. Any of these events make the
PS coordinator ready to start the authorization step. The authorizing state defines two
alternatives to achieve the authorization: either the PS coordinator first sends its creden-
tials, and then the PS coordinator does the same, or vice versa. Once the authorization
step is accomplished, the PS coordinator moves into the ExchangingCrisisDetails state.
The parallel operator is used again to model the diﬀerent alternatives in which the PS
coordinator may go through this state. The same model principles are used when stating
the number of vehicles.
We note that we have several cases where a trigger on a transition has a boolean
guard. That is the case within the NegotiatingRoutePlan state. In this particular case,
assuming the PS coordinator is in the state S.3.2.1.21, it may transition to the state
S.3.2.1.1 only at the moment the event proposeFireTrucksRoute happens, there exists
at least one route to be proposed to the FS coordinator. Otherwise the PS coordinator
remains in the same state.
Once the PS coordinator receives the agreement from the FS coordinator for the pro-
posed route plan (modeled by the event receiveFScoordinatorRouteAgreement), it tran-
sitions to the Dispatching state. Once the dispatching activities have been completed,
then the PS coordinator can transition to the DealingWithCrisis state. This state com-
prises three parallel compartments: the bottom partit models the notification of the
arrival of a vehicle to the crisis location. The middle part models the notification of
the completion of a vehicle’s mission. And the top part models the notification of the
returning of a vehicle.
These three diﬀerent behaviors are placed in parallel since the notifications must be
given/received for each vehicle. Thus, while some vehicles are still on their way to the
crisis location, others may have already arrived, or even completed their mission. It is
worth noticing that predicates are meant to ensure that a vehicle has to first arrive at
the crisis location to be able to perform its mission, and then return to its station.
Once all dispatched vehicles have returned to their respective stations, the PS coor-
dinator may transition to the state where he is allowed to close the crisis. Closing a crisis
is achieved either by receiving a closing request from the FS coordinator, and the sending
of the closing event, or first sending the request for closing and then later receiving the
same request from the FS coordinator. An alternative to this behavior may take place
when the PS coordinator is dealing with a crisis in a stand-alone mode. In that case, he
1The name of the states have been chosen such that the reader may easily find the relationship
















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 14: FS coordinator system State Machine.
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does not need to wait for FS coordinator-related events to transition. Notice that this is
not the only alternative behavior that is modeled in the statechart. All the alternatives
scenarios modeled in the sequence diagrams are also included in the statecharts. That is
the reason why there are events like recallPoliceCars or replacedPoliceCarPScoodinator,
in line with the information modeled in the sequence diagrams.
2.3.2 PS/FS system
Given the details for the PS coordinator and FS coordinator statecharts, and the relation-
ships between these elements and the PSC System and FSC System elements, respectively,
we can then model the statechart behavior as shown in Figures 15 and 16, respectively.
It is important to note that the statecharts for these four elements illustrate how the
four elements, in fact, interact, where transitions in a given statechart generate actions
that serve as triggers for transitions in one of the other statecharts. As a result, we have



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) State Machine about the Connectivity of the FSC system.
2.3.3 PS/FS system connectivity
Regarding the point about the availability of the communication channel, specific stat-
echarts were modeled to describe the availability/unavailability of the communication
channel on each system. Figures 17(a) and 17(b) show the statecharts that allow each
system to realise whether it is in a collaborative crisis management mode, or in a stand-
alone mode. Notice that each time the communication is restored, a synchronization




The high-level design is aimed at describing the software architecture and the behavior
of the components that form part of such architecture. Figure 17 depicts the peer to peer
(P2P) architectural style chosen for the bCMS system. We use the UML class diagram
notation to present the architecture as we want to adhere to widely used notations. Thus,
components are modeled as classes, whereas their interaction is described by directed
associations. PSC System and FSC System are the components (or peers) that behave
either as client or server, depending on the particular situation. The interaction between
the components is achieved by operation calls.
The refinement to the high-level design phase from the late requirements models only
aﬀects the structural part of the bCMS system. This means that the behavior of the
PSC System and FSC System components remain the same as described in the previous






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 17: bCMS software architecture.
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3 Software Product Line (SPL) modelling approach
3.1 SPL - general concepts and engineering process
Software Product Lines (SPL), or software families, are rapidly emerging as a viable and
important software development paradigm designed to handle such issues [12]. Use of
SPL approaches allowed renowned companies like Hewlett-Packard, Nokia or Motorola
to achieve considerable quantitative and qualitative gains in terms of productivity, time
to market and customer satisfaction [1]. Their increasing success relies on the capacity
to oﬀer software suppliers/vendors ways to exploit the existing commonalities in their
software products. This new concept drew the attention of the software community when
software started to be massively integrated into hardware product families, with cellular
phones [11] probably being the most well known example. More generally, automotive
systems, aerospace or telecommunications are also areas relevant for SPLs.
Several definitions of the software product line concept can be found in the research
literature. Clements et al. define it as ”a set of software-intensive systems sharing a
common, managed set of features that satisfy the specific needs of a particular market
segment or mission and are developed from a common set of core assets in a prescribed
way” [13]. Bosch provides a diﬀerent definition [4]: ”A SPL consists of a product line
architecture and a set of reusable components designed for incorporation into the product
line architecture. In addition, the PL consists of the software products developed using
the mentioned reusable assets”. In spite of the similarities, these definitions provide
diﬀerent perspectives of the concept: market-driven, as seen by Clements et al., and
technology-oriented for Bosch.
SPL engineering focuses on capturing the commonality and variability between sev-
eral software products [6]. Instead of describing a single software system, a SPL model
describes a set of products in the same domain. This is accomplished by distinguish-
ing between elements common to all SPL members, and those that may vary from one
product to another. Reuse of core assets, which form the basis of the product line, is
highly encouraged. These core assets extend beyond simple code reuse and may in-
clude the architecture, software components, domain models, requirements statements,
documentation, test plans or test cases [18].
The SPL engineering process consists of two major steps:
• Domain Engineering: or development for reuse, focuses on core assets develop-
ment. It consists of collecting, organizing, and storing past experiences in building
systems in the form of reusable assets and providing an adequate means to reuse
them for building new systems [14]. It starts with a domain analysis phase to iden-
tify commonality and variability among SPL members. During domain design, the
PL architecture is defined in terms of software components and is implemented
during the last phase.
• Application Engineering: or development with reuse, addresses the develop-
































Figure 18: General SPL engineering process.
This phase is also known as product derivation, and consists of building the ac-
tual systems from the core assets base. According to the derivation technique
used, currently available product derivation approaches can roughly be sorted in:
configuration and transformation.
Figure 18 graphically represents the general SPL engineering process, as it can be
found in the research literature [13]. As illustrated, the two phases are intertwined: appli-
cation engineering consumes assets produced during domain engineering, while feedback
from it facilitates the construction or improvement of assets.
3.2 SPL methodology used for bCrash SPL
The process of creating the bCrash SPL follows the general SPL engineering methodology
presented in the previous section. For each step of the process, we make use of the most
popular and well known available approaches. In this way, we assure that the design of
the bCrash SPL follows a traditional and well known SPL design approach. The applied
methodology follows the two well known phases of SPL engineering:
Domain engineering : during this step, the following activities are performed:
• Capture the commonality and variability between all the members of the product
line. This is done by using Feature Diagrams, the most popular and wide spread
method for representing variability in SPL. We will therefore create a feature di-
agram of the bCrash SPL system, based on the requirements document provided.
This is an essential step, as variability modelling is a key aspect of product line
engineering.
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• We also focus on core asset development. For this purpose, we will first reuse the
OO models created for the reference variant of bCrash SPL. This reference variant
consists of features (functionalities) which are mandatory for all the products of
the product line. Therefore, the OO models of this reference variant will be the
basis for creating (deriving) other products. The core asset development phase also
consists of creating models for the variation points and their associated variants.
These represent extra functionalities of the system, and allow the creation of a
diverse set of products. The variation point models, together with the models for
the reference variant, make up the entire set of models needed for representing the
bCrash SPL.
Application engineering : this phase of the process leads to the creation of an actual
product. During this step, the following activities are performed:
• Feature diagram configuration: based on the specific requirements of the user, the
feature diagram is configured. This implies that all the variation points need to
be resolved. Decisions need to be made regarding the optional features: which of
them are kept for a specific product. All the mandatory features are kept in the
new product that is derived. The result of this step is a feature diagram that does
not contain any variabiliy.
• Based on the selections made during the feature diagram configuration phase, we
obtain a set of OO models from which the model of the actual product will be
obtained. The OO models of the reference variant correspond to the mandatory
features that were selected. The models for each variation point will be configured
(transformed), based on the choices that were made for each variation point during
the feature diagram configuration step. The resulting models will be composed
with the models of the reference variant, thus obtaining the actual models of the
specific product that we are deriving.
For the design of the object-oriented models for the reference variant, the ”approaches
and the modelling languages used have been chosen in order to comply with widely
accepted standards”. This imposes some constraints SPL methodology presented here.
As UML class diagrams, sequence diagrams and state machines are the types of models
used for modelling the reference variant, the same type of models must be used to
represent the variation points.
3.3 Variability in SPL and Feature Diagrams
Variability is seen as the key feature that distinguishes SPL engineering from other
software development approaches. Variability has been defined in diﬀerent ways in a
product line context. For Weiss et al. [17] it is “an assumption about how members of
a family may diﬀer from each other”. According to Bachmann et al. [2, 3] “variability
means the ability of a core asset to adapt to usages in diﬀerent product contexts that are
within the product line scope”. For Pohl et al. [15] it is the ”variability that is modelled
33/85
to enable the development of customized applications by reusing predefined, adjustable
artefacts”.
Central to the SPL paradigm is the modelling and management of variability, the
commonalities and diﬀerences in the applications in terms of requirements, architecture,
components and test artefacts. At all these levels, a popular way to model variabil-
ity is through Feature Diagrams (FD). They are the first proposal of the product line
community for dealing with variability. According to Kang et al. [9, 10] a feature is “a
prominent or distinctive user-visible aspect, quality or characteristic of a software system
or systems”.Feature diagrams emerged as a popular SPL variability modelling technique
ever since Kang et al.s proposal in 1990 to express feature relations using a feature
model. It consists of a feature diagram and other associated information: constraints
and dependency rules.
Feature diagrams provide a graphical tree-like notation depicting the hierarchical or-
ganization of high level product functionalities represented as features. The root of the
tree refers to the complete system and is progressively decomposed into more refined
features (tree nodes). Relations between nodes (features) are materialized by decompo-
sition edges and textual constraints.
Variability can be expressed in several ways. Presence or absence of a feature from
a product is modelled using mandatory or optional features. Features can be organized
into feature groups. Boolean operators exclusive alternative (XOR), inclusive alterna-
tive (OR) or inclusive (AND) are used to select one, several or all the features from a
feature group. Moreover, dependencies between features can be modelled using textual
constraints: requires (presence of a feature imposes the presence of another), mutex
(presence of a feature automatically excludes another). Several factors contribute to the
popularity of FD: they provide a concise way to describe allowed variabilities between
products of the same family, represent feature dependencies, guide feature selection,
allow the construction of a specific product.
3.4 Creating the Feature Diagram of bCrash SPL
The feature diagram of the bCMS SPL is created based on the requirements document.
It is created in a two steps process. We start by analysing the possible variation points
listed in Section 7 of the requirements document. Then, in a second step, we analysis the
”reference variant”, in order to identify the features corresponding to the basic actions
defined in the given scenario. For this purpose we analyse both the functional and non-
functional requirements of the ”reference variant”, corresponding to Sections 4 and 5 of
the requirements document, respectively.
3.4.1 Analysis of the variation points
In the requirements document, variations are divided into functional (section 7.1 to
7.4) and non-functional (section 7.5 to 7.7) depending the type of requirement they































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 19: Feature diagram of bCMS SPL system.
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Non-functional, which descend of the root feature named bCMS. An AND feature group
decomposition is used to relate the (42) features with the parent feature Functional.
The priorities ”must have” and ”may have” defined in Table 1 of the requirements
document are translated as mandatory and optional features into the FD, respectively.
The concrete variants to be implemented by each variation point correspond to those
items listed within the ”Variations” part of each variation point. In line with that,
the information placed within the ”Constraints” part is used to determine the type of
relationship between the diﬀerent concrete variants of a variation point. Therefore, this
information leads towards the creation of the following features:
• Police and Fire Stations Multiplicity feature
This is a mandatory feature whose parent is Functional. It is decomposed into 2
mutual exclusive (XOR) features named One PS & FS and Many PS & FS.
• Vehicles Management feature
This is an optional feature whose parent is Functional. It is decomposed into 2
mutual exclusive variants. In the constraints part of Section 7.2, it is indicated that
the variant No send & receive (referred to as variant1) excludes the variants PSC
send & receive, FSC send & receive, PSC & FSC send, and PSC receive (referred
to as variants2..5, respectively). Thus, for easing the modelling, variants2−5 have
been regrouped in a unique variant called Other, which is mutually exclusive with
variant1. In this way, the first constraint is fulfilled. Variants2..5 defined in Section
7.2 become children of feature Other, are all optional, and related by an AND
decomposition. The second and third constraints are represented as “require”
feature dependencies between the diﬀerent variants.
• Vehicles Management Communication Protocol feature
This is an optional feature whose parent is Functional. It is decomposed into 2 op-
tional sub-features named SOAP and SSL. These features are related to each other
by an AND decomposition. The phrase ”In case the system oﬀers the functionality
of communication between PSC/FSC and their respective vehicles” is translated
into a “require” feature dependency between these features and the feature Other
from the feature Vehicles Management.
• Crisis Multiplicity feature
This is a mandatory feature whose parent is Functional. It is decomposed into 2
also mandatory features named Single and Multiple. These 2 features are related
by a mutual exclusion (XOR) feature decomposition.
• Communication Layer feature
This is an optional feature whose parent is Non-functional. It is decomposed in
2 mutually exclusive features named Proprietary and Other. The Other feature
is introduced in order to fulfil the first constraint given in Section 7.7. Concrete
2These variations are: Police and Fire Stations Multiplicity, Vehicles Management, Vehicles Manage-
ment communication Protocol, and Crisis Multiplicity
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variants HTTP and SOAP are children of Other feature, and they are connected
to each other by an AND feature decomposition.
• Authentication of System’s Users feature
This is an optional feature whose parent is Non-functional. It is decomposed into 5
optional children which correspond (and are named after) to the variations defined
in section 7.6. There is a further decomposition of feature Challenge response into 3
mutual exclusive sub-features called Symmetric encryption, Mutual authorization,
and Kerberos.
• Data Communication Confidentiality feature
This is a mandatory feature whose parent is Non-functional. It is decomposed into
2 mutually exclusive sub-features named Encrypted and Not encrypted.
3.4.2 Analysis of the reference variant
As the requirements document specifies, Sections 4 and 5 describe the characteristics of
a ”reference variant of the SPL”. Therefore, the analysis of these sections will produce
a set of mandatory features that should be captured in the feature diagram.
Based on the main scenario defined in Section 4, mandatory features corresponding
to the basic actions defined in this scenario can be extracted. These features become
children of the Functional feature previously defined. It is worth adding that the OO
models created for the reference variant were very useful when extracting features.
As result of this analysis, the following mandatory features are extracted:
• communication establishment
• coordinator identification
• crisis details exchange
• coordinate route plan creation
• vehicle dispatch coordination
• vehicle target arrival coordination
• objective completion coordination
• vehicle return coordination
• close crisis
The same kind of analysis is performed now on Section 5 from the requirements
document, and results in a set of features that become mandatory children of Non-
functional feature. These mandatory features are related to each other by an AND





The end result of this entire process is the feature diagram of the bCMS SPL system,
presented in Figure 19. To make its understanding easier, the features coloured in yellow
represent variation points, while the variants of a variation point are coloured in green.
3.5 UML models
This section describes the process of creating the UML models for the variation points of
the bCrash SPL and their associated variants. Two kinds of UML models are used: class
diagrams and sequence diagrams. These models are created starting from the models
provided initially for the reference variant. Each models adapts the model described for
the reference variant in order to express the particularities of the specific variation point.
Diﬀerent types of mechanisms need to be used in order to capture in these models the
”variability” aspect.
3.5.1 Vehicle Management variation point
Modelling the class diagram:
• A new class called Dispatch service is created. This class is related to the PSC
system and FSC system classes by a relation named call. This relation describes
that each class will call the dispatch service in order to contact its respective
vehicles, as well as the citizen vehicles.
• The class Dispatch service is also connected with the Police Car, Fire Truck and
Citizen Vehicle classes to express the fact that the dispatch service communicates
with all these vehicles.
• Since the communication management of vehicles corresponds to an optional fea-
ture in the FD, and in UML there is no direct way of expressing the fact that a class
is ”optional”, we make use of the stereotyping functions. Thus, the class Dispatch
service is tagged with the stereotype ￿ optional ￿. This class will be connected
with the variant Other from the Vehicle Management feature. This means that it
will only be selected when the feature Other is selected in the FD. This is the role
of the ￿ optional ￿ stereotype.
• Every method of this class is also tagged as ￿ optional ￿.
• The model of the reference variant corresponds to the selection of the feature No
send and receive. No change to the model is required in case this feature is selected

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 20: Vehicle Management variation point.
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• When the choice is made in the FD and the Other feature is selected, then the
connections (relations) between the PS coordinator class and the Police Car class
(relation manage) needs to be destroyed. The same is applied to the manage
relation between the FS coordinator and the Fire truck class. This represents the
fact that the PS coordinator and FS coordinator do not interact with the vehicles
any more, which will be done from now on through the dispatch service.
• In order to model the 4 variants of the Other feature, representing diﬀerent types
of communication between the PSC, FSC and their respective vehicles and the
citizen vehicles, new methods are introduced in the PS coordinator, PSC system,
FS coordinator, FSC system, Dispatch service, Police car, Fire Truck, and Citizen
vehicle classes. All these methods are tagged with the stereotype ￿ optional ￿,
as they belong to optional features in the feature diagram and represent optional
behaviour. We explain in the following how the variant ”Only the PSC can send to
and receive messages from police vehicles and citizen vehicles” (which corresponds
to the feature PSC send & receive) is modelled in details. The remaining variants
descending from the feature Other are modelled in a very similar fashion.
– Five new ￿ optional ￿ methods named receivePoliceCarDispatchConfirma-
tion(), receivePoliceCarArrivedAtCrisis(), receivePoliceCarCrisisObjectiveCom-
plete(), receivePoliceCarBackFromCrisis() and receiveReportAccident() are
added to the PS coordinator class.








– One ￿ optional ￿ method is added to the Police Car class: forwardDis-
patchPoliceCarOrder().
The UML class diagram model for this variation point is presented in Figure
20.
Modelling the sequence diagrams:
The introduction of the Vehicle Management variation point aﬀects steps 4,5 and 6
of the use case scenario described in Section 4 of the requirements document. Therefore,
these use cases corresponding to these steps need to be modified, in order to reflect the
specificities of the variation point.
Now, in order to model the existence and possible selection of the other variants and
represent the optional behaviour each of these variants introduces, we make use of the
”optional interaction fragment” that exists in UML sequence diagrams. The semantics
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VP vehicle management scenario 4 SD VP vehicle management scenario 4 SDinteraction [   ]
 : <optional>
Dispatch service
 : PS coordinator  : FS coordinator  : <optional>
Citizen Vehicle





[feature "PSC and FSC send" = selected]
[let 
        numRequiredPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(PoliceCar)->size()
        numRequireddFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(FireTruck)->size()
        numDispatchedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status <> 'inRouteToLocation')->size() 
        numDispatchedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status <> 'inRouteToLocation')->size() 
in






[feature "PSC send&receive" = selected]
[let 
        numRequiredPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(PoliceCar)->size()
        numRequireddFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(FireTruck)->size()
        numDispatchedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status <> 'inRouteToLocation')->size() 
        numDispatchedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status <> 'inRouteToLocation')->size() 
in






[feature "FSC send&receive" = selected]
[let 
        numRequiredPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(PoliceCar)->size()
        numRequireddFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(FireTruck)->size()
        numDispatchedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status <> 'inRouteToLocation')->size() 
        numDispatchedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status <> 'inRouteToLocation')->size() 
in






[feature "No send&receive" = selected]
[let 
        numRequiredPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(PoliceCar)->size()
        numRequireddFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(FireTruck)->size()
        numDispatchedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status <> 'inRouteToLocation')->size() 
        numDispatchedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status <> 'inRouteToLocation')->size() 
in






































Figure 21: Vehicle Management variation point - sequence diagram for scenario 4.
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of this concept is the following: it contains a guard condition that evaluated to either
true or false. If the guard condition evaluates to true, the behaviour and the interactions
described in the optional fragment are present in the described sequence diagram. In
case the guard evaluates to false, then the described sequence diagram will not contain
the behaviour described in the optional fragment. We use these optional fragments
in the following manner: we describe, in an optional fragment, the specific behaviour
introduced by a certain feature; we assign to such an optional fragment a guard condition
that evaluates to true if that feature is selected. In the following, we briefly present how
each of the sequence diagrams corresponding to the steps mentioned above are created:
Scenario 4 : we create the sequence diagram corresponding to this scenario starting from the
sequence diagram of the reference variant. We create an ”alternative” interaction
fragment. In the first operand of this alternative fragment, we add the normal
behaviour of the reference variant, which actually corresponds to the selection
of the ”No send and receive” variant in the feature diagram. The guard of this
operand is feature ”No send and receive” = selected. In the second operand of the
alternative interaction fragment, we insert three optional interaction fragments,
used to capture the variability. The first optional interaction fragment created has
the guard condition feature ”PSC send and receive” = selected. It encapsulates
the specific message exchanges introduced by this feature. The same procedure is
repeated for the second and third optional interaction fragments, which correspond
to the remaining variants of the Vehicle management variation point: FSC send
and receive and PSC and FSC send. The resulting sequence diagram is presented
in Figure 21.
Scenario 5 : as for the modelling of scenario 4, we start from the sequence diagram of the
reference variant for this scenario, which actually corresponds to the ”No send and
receive” feature. We use the same idea of the alternative interaction fragment, with
the first operand corresponding to the ”No send and receive” feature and describ-
ing its behaviour. For this scenario, only the variants ”PSC send and receive” and
”FSC send and receive” will have an impact and introduce new behaviour. There-
fore, in the ”else” part of the alternative fragment, we introduce two new optional
interaction fragments containing the specific behaviour introduced by these two
features, and set appropriate guards for these fragments. Selection of the feature
”PSC and FSC send” has no impact on this scenario, so no optional fragment cor-
responding to it has to be introduced. The final sequence diagram for this scenario
is presented in Figure 22.
Scenario 6 : the modelling of this scenario closely resembles the one for scenario 5. New
optional interaction fragments need to be introduced only for variants ”PSC send
and receive” and ”FSC send and receive”. The result is presented in Figure 23.
Scenario 7 : the modelling of this scenario closely resembles the one for scenario 5. New
optional interaction fragments need to be introduced only for variants ”PSC send
and receive” and ”FSC send and receive”. The result is presented in Figure 24.
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VP vehicle management scenario 4 SD VP vehicle management scenario 5 SDinteraction [   ]
 : <optional>
Dispatch service
 : PS coordinator  : FS coordinator  : <optional>
Citizen Vehicle





[feature "FSC send&receive" = selected]
[let 
        numRequiredPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(PoliceCar)->size()
        numRequiredFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(FireTruck)->size()
        numArrivedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status <> 'atLocation')->size() 
        numArrivedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status <> 'atLocation')->size() 
in






[feature "PSC send&receive" = selected]
[let 
        numRequiredPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(PoliceCar)->size()
        numRequiredFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(FireTruck)->size()
        numArrivedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status <> 'atLocation')->size() 
        numArrivedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status <> 'atLocation')->size() 
in






[feature "no send&receive" = selected]
[let 
        numRequiredPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(PoliceCar)->size()
        numRequiredFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(FireTruck)->size()
        numArrivedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status <> 'atLocation')->size() 
        numArrivedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status <> 'atLocation')->size() 
in




























Figure 22: Vehicle Management variation point - sequence diagram for scenario 5.
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VP vehicle management scenario 4 SD VP vehicle management scenario 6 SDinteraction [   ]
 : <optional>
Dispatch service





[feature "PSC send&receive" = selected]
[let 
        numPoliceCarsAtLocation:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status = 'atLocation')->size() 
        numFireTrucksAtLocation:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status = 'atLocation')->size() 
in






[feature "FSc send&receive" = selected]
[let 
        numPoliceCarsAtLocation:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status = 'atLocation')->size() 
        numFireTrucksAtLocation:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status = 'atLocation')->size() 
in






[feature "no send&receive" = selected]
[let 
        numPoliceCarsAtLocation:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status = 'atLocation')->size() 
        numFireTrucksAtLocation:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status = 'atLocation')->size() 
in




























Figure 23: Vehicle Management variation point - sequence diagram for scenario 6.
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VP vehicle management scenario 6.5 SDVP vehicle management scenario 4 SDinteraction [   ]
 : PS coordinator  : FS coordinator : <optional>
Dispach service





[feature "PSC send&receive" = selected]
[let 
        numRequiredPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(PoliceCar)->size()
        numrequiredFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(FireTruck)->size()
        numReturnedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status <> 'station')->size() 
        numReturnedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status <> 'station')->size() 
in






[feature "FSC send&receive" = selected]
[let 
        numRequiredPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(PoliceCar)->size()
        numrequiredFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(FireTruck)->size()
        numReturnedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status <> 'station')->size() 
        numReturnedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status <> 'station')->size() 
in






[feature "no send&receive"= selected]
[let 
        numRequiredPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(PoliceCar)->size()
        numrequiredFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate.oclAllInstances(FireTruck)->size()
        numReturnedPoliceCars:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:PoliceCar | c.status <> 'station')->size() 
        numReturnedFireTrucks:Integer = Crisis.allocate ->select(c:FireTruck | c.status <> 'station')->size() 
in




























Figure 24: Vehicle Management variation point - sequence diagram for scenario 7.
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VP vehicle management new SD introduced by variant 5VP vehicle management scenario 4 SDinteraction [   ]
 : <optional>
Dispatch service
 : PS coordinator  : <optional>
Citizen vehicle
 : PSC system





Figure 25: Vehicle Management variation point - new sequence diagram introduced by
variant 5.
An interesting aspects that needs to be mentioned regarding the modelling of the
Vehicle Management variation point concerns the ”PSC receive” variant, which models
the fact that the PSC can receive reports of accidents from citizen vehicles. This be-
haviour is completely nee and does not appear at all in any of the scenarios described in
section 4 of the requirements document. Therefore, the selection of this feature implies
the creation of a new sequence diagram to describe this particular behaviour. This is
represented in Figure 25.
Modelling the state machines:
We describe here how the state machines corresponding to this variation point were
created. They are based on the state machines initially created for the reference variant
and the sequence diagrams of the Vehicle management variation point described above.
Eight state machines need to be created, one for each actor concerned by this variation
point.
• Dispatch service state machine: the dispatch service actor appears only for
this variation point. The state machine for it contains four composite states, each
of them corresponding to one of the four variants of the Dispatch service variation
point. Each such composite state describes how the behaviour of the dispatch
service is influenced by the selection of a particular variant for this variation point.
Figure 26 presents this state machine.






















































































































































Figure 28: Vehicle Management variation point - state machine for fire truck.
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diagrams created for the Vehicle management variation point. In these sequence
diagrams, we identify all the messages sent or received by this actor. They will all
be present in the state machine for this variation point. We can observe that all
such messages appear only when the variant ”PSC send and receive” is selected.
Therefore only this variant influences the state machine for this variation point.
The resulting state machine is presented in Figure 27.
• Fire truck state machine: the creation of this state machine is quite similar
with the one previously presented for Police Car. Here, only the FSC send and
receive variant has impact on the state machine. The resulting state machine is
presented in Figure 28.
• Citizen vehicle state machine: the citizen vehicle only appears when the variant
PSC receive is selected, and reflects the fact that citizen vehicle can report accidents
to police cars and the PSC. The state machine is available in Figure 29.
• Fire station coordinator state machines: this actor is impacted by the ”FSC send
and receive” and ”PSC and FSC send” variants. For simplicity and to increase
the clarity of the models, we create a separate state machine for each of them.
When feature ”PSC and FSC send” is selected, states ”StandAlone-Arriving” and
”Arriving” from the original state machine need to be adapted. Figure 30 presents
these changes. The state machine corresponding to the selection of feature ”FSC
send and receive” is available in Figure 31.
• Police station coordinator state machines : this actor is impacted by the ”PSC
send and receive” and ”PSC and FSC send” variants of the variation point. For
simplicity, we create a separate state machine for each of them. When feature
”PSC and FSC send” is selected, states ”StandAlone-Arriving” and ”Arriving”
from the original state machine are impacted. Figure 32 presents these changes.
The state machine corresponding to the selection of feature ”PSC send and receive”
is available in Figure 33.
• FSC system state machines : the same variants as before impact also this actor.
We present in Figure 35 the changes made when feature ”PSC and FSC send” is
selected, and in Figure 34 when feature ”FSC send and receive” is selected.
• PSC system state machines: the same variants as before impact also this actor.
We present in Figure 37 the changes made when feature ”PSC and FSC send” is
selected, and in Figure 36 when feature ”PSC send and receive” is selected.
Creating the architectural model:
For this variation point, there is a significant change in terms of architectural style
used, compared to the architectural model of the reference variant. Due to the presence
of the Dispatch service class, the architectural model changes from a P2P system where
the PSC system and FSC system communicate directly, to a system with a central node
























































Figure 30: Vehicle Management variation point - state machine for FS coordinator when


































































































































Figure 31: Vehicle Management variation point - state machine for FS coordinator when













































Figure 32: Vehicle Management variation point - state machine for PS coordinator when

















































































































Figure 33: Vehicle Management variation point - state machine for PS coordinator when























































































































































































Figure 34: Vehicle Management variation point - state machine for FSC system when

















































































































































































Figure 35: Vehicle Management variation point - state machine for FSC system when









































































































































































Figure 36: Vehicle Management variation point - state machine for PSC system when

































































































































































Figure 37: Vehicle Management variation point - state machine for PSC system when
feature ”PSC and FSC send” is selected.
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FSC system components. Figure 38 presents the architectural model corresponding to
this variation point.
3.5.2 Crisis Multiplicity variation point
Modelling the class diagram:
• to represent the fact that the system can now handle multiple crises, we change
the multiplicity of the ”handle” relation between the bCrash system class and the
Crisis class at the end corresponding to the Crisis class, from 1 (as it is for the
reference variant) to 1..* ; this allows to model either the fact that only one crisis
can be managed at a time, or that more of them could be handled.
• the reference variant of the bCrash system, modelled initially and described in the
requirement doc, corresponds to the ”Single crisis” feature, one of the variants of
the ”Crisis multiplicity” variation point
• several other changes need to be made, when the ”Multiple crisis” feature (variant)
is selected
• we add the CrisisID and type attributes to the Crisis class. The CrisisID attribute
is the most important, as it represents that every crisis that can be handled by the
system is unique, and allows to uniquely identify each crisis
• we also add the isActive Boolean attribute to the Crisis class; this will specify if
the particular crisis is active or not in the system
• to represent the fact that a police car and a fire truck can be allocated to more
than one crisis, we add the multiplicity 1..* to the ”allocate” relation connecting
Police car and Fire truck to the Crisis class.
• we chose to model the fact that the system can handle multiple crisis in a simple
way, one which requires a minimum amount of change from the reference variant
already modelled: all the methods that belong to the PS coordinator, PSC system,
FS coordinator, FSC system classes which refer to any action that concerns a
crisis (eg exchange of crisis details between PSC and FSC, coordination of vehicle
dispatch to crisis, arrival at crisis sight, objective completion and return from
crisis, closing of the crisis) are parametrised with a CrisisID parameter, which will
uniquely identify a crisis. In this way, all these actions are specific to a particular
crisis. When a diﬀerent crisis needs to be handled, this is simply modelled by a
change in the value of the CrisisID parameter.
Taking all of this into consideration, the resulting class diagram for the Crisis mul-
tiplicity variation point is described in Figure 39.
Modelling the sequence diagrams:
As explained in the previous sub-section, the major diﬀerence between the UML






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 40: Crisis multiplicity variation point - sequence diagram for scenario 4.
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is the parametrization of the methods with the CrisisID parameter. This reflects also
on the sequence diagrams corresponding to this variation point. As a sequence diagram
captures the message exchanges between diﬀerent actors in the system, and because
the same methods exist in the class diagrams of the reference variant and of the Crisis
multiplicity variation point, then the behaviour that should be expressed in the sequence
diagrams corresponding to this variation point coincides to the one described for the
reference variant. Implicitly, there is no need to model diﬀerent sequence diagrams for
this variation point. The diﬀerence might be: the presence of the CrisisID parameter
in case the system handles multiple crises, but this kind of information doesn’t need to
be captured in a sequence diagram and a small adaptation of the OCL conditions from
the sequence diagrams, to reflect the fact that we are referring to the current crisis ou of
the many possible crises that can be handled. We only exemplify this on the sequence
diagram corresponding to scenario 4, presented in Figure 40. The sequence diagrams
corresponding to scenarios 5-7 are the same as the ones described for the reference
variant, with the small modifications already explained for scenario 4.
Creating the architectural model:
The architectural model corresponding to this variation point is similar to the one of
the reference variant. The same P2P architectural style is used, the only small diﬀerence
being the methods that appear in the FSC system and PSC system classes. The model
is presented in Figure 41.
3.5.3 Communication protocol variation point
Modelling the class diagram:
• a first important remark is that this variation point is directly connected with the
Vehicle Management variation point: existence of a communication management
system (facility) is a pre-requisite for the existence of this variation point. As a
consequence, we start to model the class diagram for this variation point from
the class diagram done for the Vehicle Management variation point, which we will
extend and adapt to the particular needs of this variation point
• there are 2 variants that need to be supported by the model for this variation
point: SOAP communication and SSL communication. The easiest way to sup-
port this variation is to make use of the abstraction and inheritance mechanisms
available in UML class diagrams. We therefore first transform the classes PSC
system, FSC system, Dispatch service, Police Car, Fire truck, Citizen Vehicle into
abstract classes. They will contain some abstract methods also tagged with the
stereotype optional which refer to the communication protocol. Then, for each of
these abstract classes, we add 2 concrete classes (e.g. PSC system SOAP and PSC
system SSL for the abstract class PSC system), which inherit from the abstract
class, and will specialize it with a particular behaviour. Each of these concrete
classes (one corresponding to the SOAP implementation and one to the SSL im-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 42: Communication protocol variation point.
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with concrete methods that implement either the SOAP or the SSL version of the
method.
• as an example, take the PSC system abstract class containing the forwardPolice-
CarArrivedAtCrisis() abstract method: it has two concrete classes PSC system
SOAP and PSC system SSL which inherit from it. Each of these classes contains
a method forwardPoliceCarArrivedAtCrisis() which overrides the initial abstract
method defined in the abstract class. To implement the override mechanism, the
name of the methods in the concrete classes needs to be the same with the method
in the abstract class which they override. Nevertheless, the forwardPoliceCarAr-
rivedAtCrisis( )method from the PSC system SOAP class will diﬀer in terms of
actual implementation (implements a SOAP message exchange) from its counter-
part from PSC system SSL class (implements an SSL message exchange).
• during the SPL product derivation phase, depending on the choices made by the
user, for each of the abstract classes defined in this class diagram model, one of
the concrete classes will be chosen to actually implement it.
• there are 2 UML notes in the model of the Communication Protocol variation point
which present the general methods used for SOAP communication and for SSL
communication. These general methods are then used to implement the SOAP or
SSL versions of the methods from the PSC system, FSC system, Dispatch service,
Police Car, Fire Truck, Citizen Vehicle classes. We provide this information in
order to ease the understanding of the model.
• take for example the forwardDispatchPoliceCarOrder() method defined in Police
car SOAP. This is its SOAP implementation:
Listing 1: Methods of class CAA to be used by the programmer.✞
forwardDispatchPol iceCarOrder ( )
{
decodeSOAP( Dispatch order , Dispatch s e r v i c e SOAP) ;
createSOAP (SOAPEnvelope , Dispatch order ) ;
sendSOAP( Dispatch order , Dispatch s e r v i c e SOAP, Po l i c e car )
}✝ ✆
• as another example, we present below the SSL implementation of the forwardDis-
patchTruckOrder() method from the Fire truck SSL class:
Listing 2: Methods of class CAA to be used by the programmer.✞
forwardDispatchTruckOrder ( )
{
decryptMsg ( Encrypted d i spatch order , SessionKey )
s e rv e rC l i en tAuthen t i c a t i on ( Dispatch s e r v i c e SSL , F i r e Truck )
encryptMsg ( Dispatch order , SessionKey )
sendSecure ( Encrypted d i spatch order , Dispatch s e r v i c e SSL , F i r e truck )
}✝ ✆
65/85
• in the class diagram, we provide several other examples of methods and how they
are implemented, by simply using the general methods defined in the UML notes
added to the design. Using these examples and having the general method at
disposal, it is simple a matter of changing some parameters in order to obtain the
implementation of any other method present in the design
Modelling the sequence diagrams:
As for the class diagram model of this variation point, also the sequence diagram
will closely depend to the sequence diagram of the Vehicle Management variation point,
due to the existent dependency between them. The use of inheritance and overriding
as mechanisms to capture variability in the class diagram of this variation point will
impact the sequence diagrams. The actual sequence diagrams for this variation point
are created by extending the one created for the Vehicle Management variation point.
But, due to the fact that in the class diagram we have abstract methods overridden
by concrete methods with the same name, in the corresponding sequence diagrams, the
same behaviour will be captured. This means that at the level of the sequence diagram,
there is no visible diﬀerence from the diagrams created for the Vehicle Management
variation point. It should be clear though that even though the sequence diagrams for
the Communication protocol are identical to the ones for Vehicle Management, they
actually describe diﬀerent behaviours: for the Communication protocol, the methods
present in the sequence diagrams correspond to one of the two possible implementations
oﬀered in the class diagram for this variation point. The methods have the same name,
but their implementation will be diﬀerent, depending on the choice the user has made
between either the SOAP or the SSL variant.
Creating the architectural model:
For this variation point, there is a significant change in terms of architectural style
used, compared to the architectural model of the reference variant. Due to the presence
of the Dispatch service class, the architectural model changes from a P2P system where
the PSC system and FSC system communicate directly, to a system with a central node
(the Dispatch service) that handles all communication between the PSC system and
FSC system components. Figure 43 presents the architectural model corresponding to
this variation point.
3.5.4 Confidentiality of data communications variation point
Modelling the class diagram:
• This variation point impacts every message exchange between the actors of the
system. We start modelling its class diagram starting from the class diagram of
the reference variant.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 44: Confidentiality of data communications variation point.
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• The PS coordinator, PSC system, FSC system, FS coordinator classes represent
the actors of he system who exchange messages. Therefore, for these classes, we
select all the methods that represent a message exchange between them.
• New abstract classes for the PS coordinator, PSC system, FSC system, FS coor-
dinator are created. In each of them, the previously selected methods are added
as abstract methods.
• Each of the abstract classes will have two concrete classes, that inherit from it,
that will implement it. One corresponds to the version with no encryption, while
the other to the version containing encryption of message exchanges.
• The overriding of methods mechanism is used: the concrete classes contain concrete
methods that override the abstract methods defined in the parent abstract class,
thus providing either the encryption or no encryption variants.
The resulting class diagram is available in Figure 44.
Modelling the sequence diagrams:
This type of variation impacts the functioning of the system in multiple places, as
it applies every time there is a data communication between actors of the system. In
the use case described in Section 4 of the requirements document, this variation points
impacts steps 1-7. Implicitly, we should adapt all the sequence diagrams created for the
reference variant, to capture the fact that communications between actors of the system
be either without encryption (feature Not encrypted selected) or with encryption (fea-
ture Encrypted selected). The communication with no encryption actually corresponds
to the reference variant. From the point of view of the sequence diagram, the encrypted
communication behaviour will be the same as the one without encryption. For under-
standing why, we need to go back to the class diagram model of this variation point.
Each actor of the system is represented by an abstract class which has two concrete
classes that implement it and represent either the encrypted or non-encrypted versions.
The methods of the concrete classes override the abstract methods in the parent abstract
class, and therefore have the same name, but their actual implementation will be dif-
ferent. At the level of the sequence diagram, this means that the sequence diagram for
the Encrypted variant of the Data communication confidentiality are exactly the same
as for the Non-encrypted variant. The names of the methods and their sequencing is the
same. Nevertheless, when deriving an actual product of the bCrash SPL, the behaviour
modelled will be diﬀerent, as the actual implementation of the methods is diﬀerent for
the two variants.
Creating the architectural model:
The same P2P architectural style is used also for this variation point. The corre-
sponding model can be seen in Figure 45.
3.5.5 Authentication of system’s users variation point



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 46: Authentication of system’s users variation point.
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• This variation point allows the users of the system to authenticate in diﬀerent
manners when working with the bCrash SPL system. In our case, this refers to
the actual authentication of the PS coordinator to the FS coordinator and of the
FS coordinator to the PS coordinator, when they establish communication and
need to identify themselves.
• We start constructing the class diagram for this variation point starting from the
class diagram of the reference variant
• The only thing that needs to be modified is to add in the PSC system and FSc
system classes, new methods that perform the authorized identification of one actor
to the other.
• For this purpose, we introduce one new method, tagged with the stereotype ”op-
tional”, for each type of possible authorization defined (corresponding to each of
the variants of the Authentication variation point)
• As an example, we add the following methods tagged ”optional” to the PSc system
class: passwordBasedAuthenticateFSC(), certificateBasedAuthenticateFSC(), bio-
metricBasedAuthenticateFSC(), oneTimePasswordAuthenticateFSC(), symmetri-
cEncryptionAuthenticateFSC(), mutualAuthorizationFSC(), kerberosAuthenticateFSC().
The resulting class diagram is presented in Figure 46.
Modelling the sequence diagrams:
• In the scenario described in Section 4 of the requirements document, the authen-
tication of the PSC and FSC takes place at step 1. Therefore, this is the only step
that will be aﬀected by this variation point.
• We only need to model one sequence diagram for this variation point, describing
scenario 1. For thsi, we start from the sequence diagram of scenario 1 corresponding
to the reference variant.
• We identify that the messages authPSC() and authFSC() are the only ones in this
scenario impacted by the variation point.
• We make use again of optional interaction fragments to capture the variability. We
add seven such optional interaction fragments, corresponding to all the possible
variants of the variation point. Each of these fragments has a guard condition
evaluationg to true is the corresponding feature is selected.
• The optional interaction fragments contain only one message exchange, correspond-
ing to the particular method that implements the particular type of authorization
• This procedure is applied for both the FSC and PSC authentication
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VP authentication scenario1 SD VP authentication scenario1 SDinteraction [   ]
 : PS coordinator  : FS coordinator : PSC system  : FSC system
[ ]
[feature "challenge response" = selected]
[feature "symmetric encryprion" = selected]
opt
[feature "mutual authorization" = selected]
opt
[feature "Kerberos" = selected]
opt
opt
[feature "certificate based" = selected]
opt
[feature "biometric based" = selected]
opt
[feature "one time password" = selected]
opt
[feature "password based" = selected]
opt
[ ]
[feature "challenge response" = selected]
[feature "symmetric encryprion" = selected]
opt
[feature "mutual authorization" = selected]
opt
[feature "Kerberos" = selected]
opt
opt
[feature "password based" = selected]
opt
[feature "certificate based" = selected]
opt
[feature "biometric based" = selected]
opt
































Figure 47: Authentication of system’s users variation point - sequence diagram.
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[features "challenge response" = selected AND "symmetric encryption" = selected ]
sendPScoordinatorCredentials/symmetricEncryptionAuthenticatePSC
[features "challenge response" = selected AND  "mutual authorization" = selected ]
sendPScoordinatorCredentials/mutualAuthorizationPSC
[features "challenge response" = selected AND  "Kerberos" = selected ]
sendPScoordinatorCredentials/kerberosAuthenticatePSC
[feature "one time password" = selected]
sendPScoordinatorCredentials/oneTimePasswordAuthenticatePSC
[feature "certificate based" = selected]
sendPScoordinatorCredentials/certificateBasedAuthenticatePSC
[feature "password based" = selected]
sendPScoordinatorCredentials/passwordBasedAuthenticatePSC




[features "challenge response" = selected AND "symmetric encryption" = selected]
symmetric EncryptionAuthenticateFSC/receiveFScoordinatorCredentials
[features "challenge response" = selected AND  "mutual authorization" = selected]
mutualAuthorizationFSC/receiveFScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "biometric based" = selected]
biometricBasedAuthenticateFSC/receiveFScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "password based" = selected]
passwordBasedAuthenticateFSC/receiveFScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "one time password" = selected]
oneTimePasswordAuthenticateFSC/receiveFScoordinatorCredentials
[features "challenge response" = selected AND "Kerberos" = selected]
kerberosAuthenticateFSC/receiveFScoordinatorCredentials





[features "challenge response" = selected AND "symmetric encryption" = selected ]
sendPScoordinatorCredentials/symmetricEncryptionAuthenticatePSC
[features "challenge response" = selected AND  "mutual authorization" = selected ]
sendPScoordinatorCredentials/mutualAuthorizationPSC
[features "challenge response" = selected AND "symmetric encryption" = selected]
symmetric EncryptionAuthenticateFSC/receiveFScoordinatorCredentials
[features "challenge response" = selected AND  "mutual authorization" = selected]
mutualAuthorizationFSC/receiveFScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "biometric based" = selected]
biometricBasedAuthenticateFSC/receiveFScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "password based" = selected]
passwordBasedAuthenticateFSC/receiveFScoordinatorCredentials
[features "challenge response" = selected AND  "Kerberos" = selected ]
sendPScoordinatorCredentials/kerberosAuthenticatePSC
[feature "one time password" = selected]
oneTimePasswordAuthenticateFSC/receiveFScoordinatorCredentials
[features "challenge response" = selected AND "Kerberos" = selected]
kerberosAuthenticateFSC/receiveFScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "certificate based" = selected]
certificateBasedAuthenticateFSC/receiveFScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "one time password" = selected]
sendPScoordinatorCredentials/oneTimePasswordAuthenticatePSC
[feature "certificate based" = selected]
sendPScoordinatorCredentials/certificateBasedAuthenticatePSC
[feature "password based" = selected]
sendPScoordinatorCredentials/passwordBasedAuthenticatePSC





Figure 48: Authentication variation point - state machine for the PSC system.
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The resulting sequence diagram is presented in Figure 47.
Modelling the state machine diagrams:
In the following, we briefly explain how the state machine diagrams are created for
the Authentication variation point. They are created starting from the state machine
diagrams previously done for the reference variant and the sequence diagrams done
for this variation point, which were just presented. This variation point impacts the
state machines of the PSC system and FSC system. The state machine for the PSC
system of the reference variant is presented in Figure 15. The changes introduced by the
Authentication variation point are at the level of the Authorizing and Exchanging crisis
details states and the transition between them. We also analyse the sequence diagram for
this variation point from Figure 47. In this diagram, several new messages, corresponding
to the diﬀerent possible authentication variants, are introduced in optional interaction
fragments. New transitions, corresponding to these messages, need to be introduced
therefore in the state machine for this variation point. The resulting state machine for
the PSC system is presented in Figure 48. Following a similar procedure, we create also
the state machine for the FSC system, which is shown in Figure 49.
Creating the architectural model:
Also for this variation point, the P2P architectural style is used. The architectural
model corresponding to this variation point is presented in Figure 50.
3.6 Deriving a product of the bCMS SPL system
We conclude the section on SPL modelling of bCrash SPL by presenting how a specific
individual product can be obtained from all the models created so far. The product we
want to obtain should have the following features: describe the case of a single police
station and fire station; have a vehicle management functionality that allows both po-
lice and fire stations to send messages to their respective vehicles; the communication
between the police/fire stations and their respective vehicles will be done using a SOAP
communication protocol; the system can handle a single crisis at a time; communica-
tion is done through a proprietary communication layer; system supports a certificate
based authentication mechanism; data communication confidentiality is ensured by hav-
ing encrypted communication. This derivation process corresponds to the Application
Engineering phase of the SPL engineering process we follow throughout this paper.
The first activity that needs to be performed is to configure the feature diagram.
This means that all the variation points defined in the initial feature diagram have to
be resolved. The resolution of the variation points is done based on the specific choices
made before:
• Police and Fire station multiplicity : variant ”One PS and FS” is selected. The
XOR feature relation automatically excludes the other possible variant ”Multiple
PS and FS”.
• ”Vehicles management”: variant ”PSC and FSC send” is selected.
• ”Vehicle management communication protocol”: variant ”SOAP” is selected.
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[features "challenge response" = selected AND "symmetric encryption" = selected ]
sendFScoordinatorCredentials/symmetricEncryptionAuthenticateFSC
[features "challenge response" = selected AND  "mutual authorization" = selected ]
sendFScoordinatorCredentials/mutualAuthorizationFSC
[features "challenge response" = selected AND  "Kerberos" = selected ]
sendFScoordinatorCredentials/kerberosAuthenticateFSC
[feature "one time password" = selected]
sendFScoordinatorCredentials/oneTimePasswordAuthenticateFSC
[feature "certificate based" = selected]
sendFScoordinatorCredentials/certificateBasedAuthenticateFSC
[feature "password based" = selected]
sendFScoordinatorCredentials/passwordBasedAuthenticateFSC




[features "challenge response" = selected AND "symmetric encryption" = selected]
symmetric EncryptionAuthenticatePSC/receivePScoordinatorCredentials
[features "challenge response" = selected AND  "mutual authorization" = selected]
mutualAuthorizationPSC/receivePScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "biometric based" = selected]
biometricBasedAuthenticatePSC/receivePScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "password based" = selected]
passwordBasedAuthenticatePSC/receivePScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "one time password" = selected]
oneTimePasswordAuthenticatePSC/receivePScoordinatorCredentials
[features "challenge response" = selected AND "Kerberos" = selected]
kerberosAuthenticatePSC/receivePScoordinatorCredentials





[features "challenge response" = selected AND "symmetric encryption" = selected ]
sendFScoordinatorCredentials/symmetricEncryptionAuthenticateFSC
[features "challenge response" = selected AND  "mutual authorization" = selected ]
sendFScoordinatorCredentials/mutualAuthorizationFSC
[features "challenge response" = selected AND "symmetric encryption" = selected]
symmetric EncryptionAuthenticatePSC/receivePScoordinatorCredentials
[features "challenge response" = selected AND  "mutual authorization" = selected]
mutualAuthorizationPSC/receivePScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "biometric based" = selected]
biometricBasedAuthenticatePSC/receivePScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "password based" = selected]
passwordBasedAuthenticatePSC/receivePScoordinatorCredentials
[features "challenge response" = selected AND  "Kerberos" = selected ]
sendFScoordinatorCredentials/kerberosAuthenticateFSC
[feature "one time password" = selected]
oneTimePasswordAuthenticatePSC/receivePScoordinatorCredentials
[features "challenge response" = selected AND "Kerberos" = selected]
kerberosAuthenticatePSC/receivePScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "certificate based" = selected]
certificateBasedAuthenticatePSC/receivePScoordinatorCredentials
[feature "one time password" = selected]
sendFScoordinatorCredentials/oneTimePasswordAuthenticateFSC
[feature "certificate based" = selected]
sendFScoordinatorCredentials/certificateBasedAuthenticateFSC
[feature "password based" = selected]
sendFScoordinatorCredentials/passwordBasedAuthenticateFSC





Figure 49: Authentication variation point - state machine for the FSC system.
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Figure 50: Authentication variation point - architectural model
• ”Crisis multiplicity”: variant ”Single” is selected. The XOR feature relation au-
tomatically excludes the other possible variant ”Multiple”.
• ”Communication layer”: variant ”Proprietary” is selected. The XOR feature re-
lation automatically excludes the other possible variant ”Other” and implicitly all
of its children.
• ”Authentication”: variant ”Certificate based” is selected.
• Data communication confidentiality : variant ”Encrypted” is selected. The XOR
feature relation automatically excludes the other possible variant ”Not encrypted”.
These are all the variation points present in the feature diagram. All the other
features that remain are mandatory features, so they need tobe selected for the product
that we are deriving. The result of the feature diagram configuration process is presented
in Figure 51.
The next step to be performed in the derivation process is to resolve the class diagram
models for each variation point. This is done based on the choices previously made during
the feature model configuration step. Based on those choices, several adaptations will
be made to class diagram models of each variation point:
• Police and Fire station multiplicity : even though this variation point was not mod-














































































































































































































































































Figure 51: Deriving a specific product - configured feature diagram.
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variant initially modelled using object-oriented approaches. Therefore, this fea-
ture will not add anything new to the original class diagram model of the reference
variant.
• ”Vehicles management”: variant ”PSC and FSC send” was selected. The class
diagram modelled for this variation point is changed in the following way: we
analyse the sequence diagrams corresponding to this variation point and for all
of them we extract the message exchanges that correspond to the selection of the
”PSC and FSC send” variant; these message exchanges correspond to the methods
that need to be kept in the configured class diagram for this variation point. The
result of this process is the class diagram presented in Figure 52.
• ”Crisis multiplicity”: variant ”Single” was selected. The configured class diagram
for this variation point does not bring anything new to the class diagram of the
reference variant.
• ”Vehicle management communication protocol”: this optional feature was selected
and variant ”SOAP” was selected for it. Several changes are necessary to configure
the class diagram for this variation point. For classes PS coordinator and FS
coordinator, all the methods tagged optional become normal methods. For classes
PSC system, FSC system, Dispatch service, Police car, Fire truck, Citizen vehicle,
we make the following changes: all methods tagged optional are kept and become
normal methods; the classes are not abstract any more and their abstract methods
are replaced withe the concrete SOAP version of of each method. The result is the
class diagram from Figure 53.
• ”Communication layer”: even though this variation point was not modelled, the
choice made, variant ”Proprietary”, corresponds to the reference variant modelled
initially using object-oriented approaches. Therefore, the models for this feature
do no bring anything new to the original OO models of the reference variant.
• ”Authentication”: variant ”Certificate based” was selected for this variation point.
To configure the class diagram of this variation point, the following changes need to
be made: in the PSC system and FSC system classes, from all the methods tagged
optional, only keep the one corresponding to the certificate based authentication,
which will also become a normal method. The resulting class diagram is presented
in Figure 54.
Data communication confidentiality : variant ”Encrypted” is selected. We can no-
tice that in the class diagram for this variation point presented in Figure 44, all the
classes, except bCrash System, are abstract classes. When we configure this class
diagram, the abstract classes will become concrete one, so their abstract methods
are replaced by concrete methods corresponding to the version with encryption.
The result of this process is the class diagram presented in Figure 55.
To obtain the final class diagram describing the particular product that we are de-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 55: Variation point Data communication Confidentiality - resolved
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original class diagram of the reference variant. The type of composition used is a UML
class diagram merge. The result of the composition process is presented in Figure 56.
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Figure 56: Class diagram of derived product
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bCMS Overall system for managing a crisis involving a Fire State Coordinator (FS 
coordinator) and a Police Station Coordinator (PS coordinator) via their 
respective software interfaces (FSC System and PSC System).  
Relationships This element aggregates into the PSC System and FSC System to “handle” a 











Human being in charge of coordinating the activities on the fire station side, and  
communicating the decisions made to the PS coordinator. 
Attributes  
 -credential:Credential FS coordinator's credential to 
be used when identifying 
with the PS coordinator 
Operations  
+receivePScoordinatorCall() Call to request a 
communication with a PS 
coordinator. 
+receivePScoordinatorCredentials(Credential)  Call to pass the PS 
coordinator credentials. 
+receivePScrisisDetails(Crisis) Call to give the crisis details 




Call to pass the route plan 
for fire trucks. 
+receivePoliceCarDispatched() Call to inform a police car 
has been dispatched to the 
crisis location. 
+receivePoliceCarArrived() Call to inform a police car 




Call to inform a police car 
has completed its mission. 
+receivePoliceCarBack() Call to inform a police car 
has returned to its station. 
+receiveCloseCrisisPS() Call to request the closing of 
the mission. 
+receiveDeployPoliceCars(Integer) Call to inform the number of 
police cars to be deployed. 
+receivePScoordinator 
UncoordinatedRoute() 
Call to inform the route plan 
will not be coordinated. 
+routeNegotiationTimeout() Call to inform the route plan 
negotiation has passed its 
deadline. 
 
+receiveRescheduleRoutePlan() Call to create a new route 
plan as more vehicles are 
required due to the higher 
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severity of the crisis. 
+receiveRecallPoliceCars(Integer) Call to inform the recalling 
of certain number of police 
cars due to the lower 
severity of the crisis. 
+receiveReplacedPoliceCar() Call to inform a police car 
has been replaced by 
another one.  
+receiveNewETApoliceCar() Call to inform the ETA of a 
police car. 
+standAloneResolution() Call to inform the PSC is in 
stand-alone mode. 
 
+online() Call to inform the PSC is in 
collaborative mode. 
Relationships The FS coordinator interacts with the FSC system to deal with the crisis in a 
collaborative manner. When dealing with the crisis the FS coordinator interacts with 
Fireman to manage the FireTrucks efficiently. In case the negotiation with the PS 
coordinator takes longer than expected, the FS coordinator has to report the reasons 








FSC System Software system that manages the interactions between the FS coordinator 
and the PSC System (that manages communication from the PS 
coordinator) 
Attributes  
-routeAgreement : Boolean  The PS coordinator and FS 
coordinator have reached 
agreement about the route 
plan 
 
-closeAgreement : Boolean The PSC and FSC have 
reached agreement to close 
the crisis 
Operations  
+fireTrucksRoute(RoutePlan)  Call from PSC to inform the  
proposed route plan for fire 
trucks 
+policeCarDispatched() Call from PSC to inform a 
police car was dispatched to 
the crisis location 
+policeCarArrived() Call from PSC to inform a 




Call from FS coordinator to 
inform a fire truck has 
completed its mission 
+reqComPSC(Credential)  Call from PSC to establish 
communication 
 
+authPSC(Credential)  Call from PSC to 
authenticate the PS 
coordinator  
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Call from FS coordinator to 
pass his credentials 
+sendFSCrisisDetails(Crisis)  Call from FS coordinator to 
inform the crisis details 
+crisisDetailsPSC(Crisis)  Call from PSC System to 
inform the crisis details  
+deployFireTrucks()  Call from FS coordinator to 
deploy fire trucks. 
+agreeFireTrucksRoute()  Call from FS coordinator to 
agree on route for fire trucks 
+disagreeFireTrucksRoute()  Call from FS Coordinator to 




Call from FS coordinator to 
inform a fire truck has been 




Call from FS coordinator to 
inform a fire truck has arrived 
at the crisis location. 
+policeCarObjectiveCompleted()  Call from PSC to inform a 
police car completed its 
mission. 
+fireTruckBackFScoordinator()  Call from FS coordinator to 
inform a fire truck has 
returned to the station. 
+policeCarBack()  Call from PSC to inform a 
police car has returned to the 
station. 
+closeCrisisFScoordinator()  Call from FS coordinator to 
request the closing of the 
crisis 
+closeCrisisPS() Call from PSC to request the 
closing of the crisis 
+policeCars(Integer)  Call from PSC to inform the   
number of police cars to be 
deployed 
+uncoordinatedRoute()  Call from PSC to inform the 
route plan is not going to be 
coordinated 
+reportReasonsTimeout()  Call from FS coordinator to 




Call from FS coordinator to 
inform the new ETA of a fire 
truck 
 
+rescheduleRoutePlanPSC()  Call from PSC to create a 
new route plan as more 
vehicles are required due to 
the higher severity of the 




Call from FS coordinator to 
create a new route plan as 
more vehicles are required 
due to the higher severity of 
the crisis. 
+recallPoliceCars(Integer) Call from PSC to inform the 
recalling of certain number of 
police cars due to the lower 
severity of the crisis. 
+recallFireTrucks(Integer)  Call from PS coordinator to 
inform the recalling of certain 
number of fire trucks due to 




Call from PSC to inform a 
police car has been replaced 
by another one. 
+newETApoliceCar() Call from PSC to inform the 
ETA of a police car 
+comTimeout()  Call to inform that the 
communication between FSC 
and PSC is down. 
+comRestored()  
 
Call to inform that the 
communication between FSC 
and PSC has been restored 
 
+synchPSC() Call from PSC to inform its 
current state 
   Relationships This element interacts with the FS coordinator, and it is expected to receive 
a RoutePlan. It also may register a TimeoutLog in case a time out happens 









Crisis The vehicular crisis to be handled by the collaboration of the Police and Fire 
department. 
Attributes  
-id : Integer  Each crisis has a unique integer identifier. 
-location : GPS  Each crisis has a satellite-based location 
-startTime: TimeExpression  A 24-hour clock time is used to denote the 
initiation of a crisis (when the crisis is 
reported to the bCMS system) 
-endTime : TimeExpression A 24-hour clock time is used to denote when 
the crisis considered closed by both FSC and 
PSC coordinators 
-status : Enum (“Active”, 
“Closed”) 
Enumerated type for status of crisis (active or 
closed) 
 
-description : String Text-based description of crisis, including 
nature of crisis (single car accident, multiple 
Appendix: Data Dictionary for OOM Domain Model 










Status Enumerated data type 
Attributes  
active:String The crisis is still ongoing  
closed: String The vehicle has been already solved 










-crisisID : Integer  Each crisis has a unique integer identifier.  
-information : String Text-based description of crisis, including nature of 
crisis (single car accident, multiple car accident, fire 
hazard, number of victims involved, etc.) 
Relationships Comprises RoutePoliceCar and RouteFireTruck for routes for police and fire 
trucks, respectively. In addition, it is an aggregate of the PSC System that is 











-crisisID : Integer  Each crisis has a unique integer identifier. 
-submissionTime: 
TimeExpression  
A 24-hour clock time is used to denote when 





24 hour clock denotes when the 
communication failed (i.e., timeout occurred) 
 
-reason : String Text-based description for reason of timeout 
(e.g., problem on one or both coordinator 
sites, or faulty communication infrastructure) 
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Name 
Route Route for crisis management vehicles. 
Attributes  
-ETA: TimeExpression 24 hour clock denotes the estimated 
amount of time it will take for 
emergency vehicle to reach crisis 
site. 
 
-path : String A string of directions starting with 
origination and ending at crisis site, 
where each direction comprises a 
heading (e.g., north, south, east, west, 
etc.), street name, distance to travel 
on that street).  





Element Name Description 
RoutePoliceCar Route for a police car 
Relationships Each instance of this class is associated with the PoliceCar 
vehicle expected to follow such a route. 
UML Extensions It extends from Route class 
 
Element Name Description 
RouteFireTruck Route for a fire truck 
Relationships Each instance of this class is associated with the FireTruck 
vehicle expected to follow such a route. 





Position Enumerated data type 
Attributes  
station:String The vehicle is at its station 
inRouteToLocation: String The vehicle is going to the crisis 
location 
atLocation: String The vehicle is at the crisis place 
 
inRouteFromLocation: String The  vehicle is returning to its central 
station. 








FireTruck Fire truck requested to solve the vehicular crisis 
Attributes  
 -position: Position Current position of the fire truck 
Relationships Each fire truck is allocate to the current ongoing crisis. The use of the fire truck 
is managed by the FS coordinator. 








PoliceCar Police car requested to solve the vehicular crisis 
Attributes  
 -position: Position Current position of the police car 
Relationships Each police car is allocate to the current ongoing crisis. The use of the police car 








GPS Satellite-based location 
Attributes  
-x:Float Latitude coordinate  
-y:Float Longitude coordinate 






Element Name Description 
Fireman Firemen involved in the solving of the vehicular crisis 
Relationships A firemen interacts with the FS coordinator that gives him 
orders, and with the Victims of the crisis. He also might interact 
with some of crisis' Witnesses 
UML Extensions NA 
 
Element Name Description 
PoliceOfficer Police officer involved in the solving of the vehicular crisis 
Relationships A police officer interacts with the PS coordinator that gives 
him orders, and with the Victims of the crisis. He also might 
interact with some of crisis' Witnesses 
UML Extensions NA 
 
 
Element Name Description 
Victim Person(s) involved in crisis 
Relationships Provide information (interact) to the fire and police personnel 
UML Extensions NA 
 
 
Element Name Description 
Witness Person(s) who witnessed the crisis before,  during, or after its 
occurrence 
Relationships Provide information (interact) to the fire and police personnel 
UML Extensions NA 
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Element Name Description 
Government Agency Entity responsible for regulating the police and fire stations and 
protocols. 
Relationships Serves to regulate the policies realized by the bCMS system 
UML Extensions NA 
 
 
Element Name Description 
Communication 
infrastructure 
The means by which fire personnel correspond with the FS 
Coordinator, the police with the PS Coordinator, and how the FS 
and PS Coordinators communicate amongst themselves and with 
their respective software systems.  
Relationships The bCMS system uses the Communication Infrastructure to 
supports all of its communication needs. 
UML Extensions NA 
 
 
Element Name Description 
Communication 
compromiser 
This is an entity that might compromise the communication, 
including security threats, overloading of networking, etc. 
Relationships Potentially accesses Communication Infrastructure 
UML Extensions NA 
 
